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First of all I feel that we were recruited under what amounted to false pretenses. Through our youthful eagerness and strong motivation it was easy to convince us that we should drop everything and rush to join the outfit where there was a big important job waiting for us. We were made to feel that each one had a definite slot and that he was needed to fill it in a hurry. Talk of military credit was brushed aside with the retort that the outfit was much more important and that such talk was hardly pertinent. We were told that career men were wanted and that we were getting in on the ground floor of a great thing. They told us that we had been a carefully picked group of young men, but I do not think that the testing and interviewing systems that we were selected on were nearly adequate. Nothing ever seemed to be done on the basis of the testing which came after the training course.

We were given a sales talk when we came into the outfit. We were not told that we were going to start at the bottom, do menial tasks, face snafu after snafu, and feel all the growing pains of a very large outfit which did not know yet quite where it was going or how it was going to get there. If we had been told the truth we would have been saved some of the disillusionment and some of the dreamers would never have come in.

I have no doubt that what we were told on coming in was true in a way, but under the subsequent treatment we received it was hard to keep up faith in the outfit. After we had hurried and dropped everything to come to the outfit we sat, sometimes for months, in the pool.

The real let-down began when we finished training. The offices we had been assigned to had no idea what to do with us and it became obvious that,

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in most cases, no post-training plans had been made for us. This was inexcusable operationally and a personal affront. If they had hired us at all they should have known what they were going to do with us. While we waited in Washington we should have been given help in getting language instruction and taking other courses. Some one should have been given the responsibility of planning what to do with us long before we finished our training. There were many things that we could have been given to do if some one had taken the trouble to figure the problem out. We were kept completely out of the office, however, with the result that most of us had no idea of what went on in our home offices when we got overseas. This left a blank in my knowledge which I have felt very keenly ever since.

After a few months of idle waiting at home, during which time we had to fight to get time off from our chairs in empty rooms to take language instruction at our own expense, the lucky ones were sent overseas. There again we realized that there had been no preparation made for our arrival. Our assessments, which had been worked out with such painstaking care by the training people and others, were not even sent with us. Bodies were simply sent to any low-level job which might be open. As far as I could see there was very little attempt to fit the right people in the right places.

As soon as we became assigned to places in Europe it became apparent that there was not a full days work to do in most cases. No amount of effort or initiative could secure the right to do some work. It seems obvious that the chiefs in Europe should have gotten their people by asking to have specific slots filled, not by having droves of bodies sent over which they did not know how they were going to use. There should also have

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been some one to guard against chiefs calling for bodies simply to build up their own importance. I often got the impression that more and more people were being called for when the only work function they could have was to help perpetuate themselves and the others over here. This was mainly due to the elaborate and unnecessary support complex which was built up.

Another reason why I feel there was no work of a constructive nature to do is that there were no decisions made as to just what was to be done and how. Airy plans were never put down in the form of you do this and you do that. Lacking this, most of the chiefs failed to delegate responsibility to those who were under them.

I was assigned to a project which had about 15 contract agents, most of them Americans with first papers, under it. The project had all the money and manpower needed, but no one was ever allowed to do anything. There was a full days work for about three contract agents instead of 15 and those who did work spent most of their time getting the others 25X1C These men, who had given up everything in their new homes in America, had come over here under pressure of an unscrupulous recruiting program. The months of idle waiting, followed in many cases by an unexplained separation from the outfit reduced greatly the assets we had in the good will and faith of these men. What had been a strong ideological motivation was dissipated and replaced by nthe inexcusably sloppy way they were treated. I must admit that when I saw the way these people were treated, my faith in the care that the outfit takes of its personnel was shaken. have been international political reasons for this lack of work, but this

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does not excuse the fact that those ultimately in charge of them took little interest in their fate and had little understanding of their problems. They were paid plenty of money, but this was not the only thing needed.

Another thing which I think disgusted many of us was the way the reduction of personnel was run over here. High graders were rarely sent home, even where they had proved themselves to be incompetent. They were sometimes put in charge of projects for which they had no qualification except their grade. When these men were sent home they often got jobs in Washington which their performance here had not justified. In the meantime other deserving men who went home lost out because they did not have the right contacts.

The difficulty of military credit has always caused a great deal of trouble. I can see that this is a difficult problem for those trying to handle it, but we often got the feeling over here that no one was really interested in it. Questions from here were not answered or else they were answered late and ambiguously. If nothing can be done about it we would like to know it and not be put off with maybes. I am inclined to feel that the sixteen week program is a complete waste of time for PMs and that if we must make a token concession of some sort we should take training which would be useful to us.

A thing which shocked many of us was the lack of security whenever it was inconvenient. A great emphasis was placed hous- 25X1C ing, for everything in general. This system discourages the relations with the natives which it seems to me every young case officer should strive for in order to gain experience and know-how in

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dealing with them.

To me one of the most discouraging features of our overseas operational system was the fact that chiefs exercised the power to keep the ideas of their subordinates from the people in Washington. This often enabled them to hide their own incompetence or unjustifiable actions they had taken. Writings which made them appear in a bad light were often held up or destroyed.

In my present job I have not seen any of the difficulties about which I complained above. I do not believe, however, that there has been a significant change in the situation lately. High graders with no background and area knowledge who do not possess the executive ability to balance this lack are still in charge of projects. Young men like myself who come back from a tour of duty overseas are not given offers of other jobs or fired on the basis of their performance. Instead it appears that no one in Washington has time to study their records and decide what should be done with them. Placement in jobs seems to depend more on an individual's luck in knocking on the right door than anything else. There seems to be no long term planning to give young men good career training by placing them in the right jobs. The situation seems to have reduced itself to a short-term struggle for jobs with no emphasis on long-term career planning.

Since I have been overseas it has been almost impossible for me to find out what opportunities exist for me after my tour here is over.

This difficulty seems to exist everywhere and I feel that the apparent lack of a placement and career program is the greatest factor which determs young men from making a career of the agency.